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MAKING MISTAKES
P.S. Davies*

ABSTRACT
This article discusses the legal impact of mistakes made by parties in
contractual transactions in common law. It begins by highlighting the
difficulty in defining mistakes, and goes on to discuss situations in which
courts allow parties to escape performance of contracts concluded on the
basis of a mistake. The authorhas discussed the effect of a mistake in varied
circumstances, such as unilateral mistake (mistaken identity), deeds,
unjust enrichment and proprietary restitution. The author argues that a
claimant should be entitled to relief only in the event of a fundamental
mistake. This restricts the situations in which parties can avoid a contract,
thereby increasingcommercial certainty.The author has analysed separately
transactions under contracts and deeds and those which are gratuitous.
He concludes by opining that when parties plead mistake as a ground for
avoidance, the courts must be cautious in upholding such claims and must
allow it in rare circumstances. The author suggests that parties should bear
the consequences of their mistakes, as holding otherwise would unfairly
prejudice innocent thirdparties,
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I. INTRODUCTION
"The mistakes are all there waiting to be made."
Chess Grandmaster Savielly Tartakower
"Mistakes are almost always of a sacred nature, Never try to correct them.
On the contrary: rationalisethem, understandthem thoroughly.After that,
it will be possiblefor you to sublimate them."
-

- Salvador Dali, journal entry, 30 June 1952 in
"Diary of a Genius" (1966)
Mistakes are common. It is difficult to survive an entire day without making a
mistake. We are taught from childhood to "learnfrom our mistakes". This is coupled
with a realisation that we have to live with the consequences of our mistakes. It is
because of this that we learn- or, at least, hope to learn - not to repeat our mistakes.
Given the frequency with which mistakes occur, it is unsurprising to find
the courts regularly grappling with cases involving mistakes. The vast array
of possible mistakes, and the very different contexts and consequences of such
mistakes, have made it difficult for the courts to establish clear guidelines about
what the effect, if any, of a mistake should be. This article will focus upon mistaken
transactions in English law. This area of the law is complex and fraught with
difficulties and fine distinctions. It will be argued that the law should, generally,
not intervene to correct a mistake. This should protect the important principles
of security of receipt and finality of transactions; certainty and the ability to rely
upon completed transactions are particularly important in the commercial sphere.
But there are, of course, exceptions to the principle that parties should have to
live with their mistakes. One exception that seems to pervade private law is that
relief may be available if the mistake was "fundamental". However, the notion of
a fundamental mistake has been described as "notoriously uncertain".2 This article
will seek to examine what is meant by "fundamental mistake", and explain why
only a very limited class of mistakes should ever assist a claimant. Yet it should
be noted at the outset that insisting upon the need for a fundamental mistake
means that a claimant seeking relief needs to establish and rely upon the fact that
he made a massive, fundamental mistake, rather than any "lesser", and perhaps
more understandable, mistake.
Transactions effected under contracts, deeds, and entirely freely and
gratuitously will be distinguished and examined separately. The controversies in
1

This term is defined broadly in this article to cover gifts as well.

2

G. ViRco, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF REsTrruTioN 585 (2"'edn, 2006).
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each area will be outlined and some assessment made. A common difficulty within
this topic is that the very term 'mistake' is not easy to define. In Barrow v.Isaacs,
Kay L.J. expressed the view that, "very wisely ...
the Courts have abstainedfrom giving
any generaldefinition of what amounts to a mistake". Yet such an approach may only
serve to increase the uncertainties inherent in this area. More recently, in Great
Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International)Ltd,Lord Phillips MR stated,
"a mistake can be defined simply as an erroneous belief. 4 But does such a belief have
to be consciously held? Views legitimately differ. 5 However, it is suggested that a
wide view of mistake may be employed for present purposes, such that tacitly held
beliefs can be mistaken. 6 The definition of mistake may not need to be restricted,
provided that only a limited class of 'fundamental' mistakes may ground relief.
This will be elaborated below.

II. CONTRACT
A party to a contract may seek to escape the consequences of the transaction
by pleading mistake. However, English law generally takes a sceptical view of
such claims.7 A party may claim that the written document itself is mistaken, but
the courts will not easily accept that a mistake has been made,8 or that it should
be corrected. More fundamentally, a party may contend that it is mistaken as to
the substance of the bargain. Although it is well-established that a non-mistaken
party cannot 'snap up' an offer where he knows the other party is mistaken, 10
3

4
5

Barrow v. Isaacs, (1891) 1 QB 417, 425 [Court of Appeal].
Great Peace Shipping Ltd v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd,[2002] EWCA Civ
1407, [2003] QB 679, [281 [Court of Appeal].
Sheehan, What is aMistake?, 20 LEGAL STUDIES 538 (2000), argues that a conscious belief
is required, whereas FARNSWORTH,

ALLEVIATING MISTAKES: REVERSAL AND FORGIVENESS

FOR FLAWED PERCEPTIONS (2004) is prepared to take a wider view.

6
7

8
9
10

See Pitt v Holt, [2011] EWCA Civ 197; [2011] 3 WLR 19 [Court of Appeal], considered
below. [Hereinafter, "Pitt"]
Parties should not be able to escape a bad bargain that results from their own volition:
e.g. A claimant will not be able to claim his reliance loss instead of expectation loss in
order to escape a losing contract (C & P Haulage (a firm) v. Middleton, [1983] 1 WLR
1461) [Court of Appeal].
See Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v. West Bromwich Building
Society, [1998] 1 WLR 896,912-3 [House of Lords]; Chartbrook Ltd v. Persimmon Homes
Ltd, [2009] UKHL 38; [2009] 1 AC 1101, [14] [House of Lords].
Correction might occur either through interpretation or rectification. See R. Buxton,
"Construction"and Rectification After Chartbrook,69 CAMBRIDGE LAW JOURNAL 253 (2010).
See Hartog v. Colin & Shields,[1939] 3 All ER 566 [King's Bench Division]. See also,
Smith v. Hughes,(1871) LR 6 QB 597 [Queen's Bench].
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generally the law insists that autonomous parties can fend for themselves and that
the court should not interfere in the bargain reached." But controversial instances
of mistake arise where a party claims that a contract is void for a "common mistake"
or "unilateralmistake", and these areas will now be considered in turn.
A. Common Mistake
Where both parties share a common mistake, it might be thought logical that
a contract be declared void. However, such an approach would undermine the
stability of contracts. After all, the role of the courts is, generally, simply to give
effect to the bargain which the parties have entered, rather than disturb, alter, or
invalidate that agreement. If the parties want to set aside the contract, then they
can mutually agree to do this. But there is no need for the court to interfere. This
is particularly important because contracts may not solely concern the original
parties to the agreement; contractual rights might have been assigned to third
parties, for example.
Nevertheless, if the parties share a 'fundamental' mistake, then the agreement
may be said to be void. The leading decision remains that of the House of Lords in
Bell v. Lever Brothers.'2 The case concerned Bell and Snelling, who were directors of
a company operating in West Africa. They were paid large severance payments by
the controlling parent company, Lever Brothers. Lever Brothers later discovered
that the directors had already been dismissed without compensation because of
their breach of fiduciary duties. Lever Brothers sought to recover the severance
payments on the ground of mistake.
The House of Lords examined the disparate authorities on the issue of
mistake. A bare majority held that the payments could not be recovered. This was
because the mistake was not sufficiently serious, or fundamental. Lord Thankerton
insisted that mistake has to, "relate to something which both must necessarily3have
accepted in their minds as an essential and integral element of the subject-matter".1
Emphasising that mistake would rarely operate to vitiate an agreement,
Lord Atkin said:
"It is of paramountimportance that contracts should be observed, and that
if parties honestly comply with the essentials of the formation of contracts
11
12

13

After alt the courts will not examine the "adequacy" of consideration as long as it is
"sufficient" (See Thomas v. Thomas, (1842) 2 QB 851).
Bell v. Lever Brothers, j1932] AC 161 [House of Lords]. [Hereinafter, "Bell"]
Bell,235.
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i.e., they agree in the same terms on the same subject-matter - they are
bound, and must rely on the stipulationsof the contractfor protectionfrom
the effect of facts unknown to them.""
-

As a result of the decision in Bell, very few mistakes will have the effect that
parties can escape the transaction. This restrictive approach protects the finality of
transactions, and enables all concerned - and third parties - to rely upon concluded
contracts. It is worth highlighting how little scope remains for arguing that a
contract is void on the basis of a shared mistake. On the facts of Bell itself, Lever
Brothers already had the right to terminate the employment of the directors; in
effect, they were paying for something they already owned. Moreover, the directors
were selling their right to continue in employment, even though this was a right
they no longer possessed." The minority's insistence that this contract was void for
mistake was therefore far from outrageous. Yet the decision in Bell has consistently
it
been supported, and if the mistake was insufficiently fundamental in Bell, then
16
case.
future
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mistake
fundamental
a
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difficult
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will be
The limited scope of relief for mistake was supported more recently by the
Court of Appeal in Great Peace Shipping Ltd.v. Tsavliris Salvage (International)Ltd.."
A salvage company hired the claimant's ship for five days to escort a ship which
was in danger of sinking in the Indian Ocean. The salvage company had thought
the claimant's ship was much closer than it actually was; in fact, another ship
was nearer and better-placed to provide assistance. The salvage company sought
to argue that the contract was void on the basis of a fundamental mistake. This
argument was rightly rejected. The Court of Appeal emphasised that the mistake
was not fundamental: the claimants could still provide the assistance envisaged
and escort the ship under the agreement reached.
Lord Phillips MR took the opportunity to formulate the requirements of
common mistake:
"The following elements must be present if common mistake is to
avoid a contract: (i) there must be a common assumption as to the

14

15
16

17

Bell, 224.
See J.C. Smith, Contracts-Mistake,Frustrationand Implied Terms, 10 LAW QUARTERLY
REviEw 400,414-415 (1994). [Hereinafter, "SMITh"]
Beyond mistake as to subject matter, further instances may include "commercial
impossibility" (e.g. Griffith v. Brymer, (1903) 19 TLR 434.) [King's Bench Division],
"physical impossibility" (e.g. Sheikh Bros Ltd v. Ochsner,[1957] AC 136.) and "legal
impossibility"; See E. PEEL, TREITL: THE LAW Of CONTRACT 317318 (13thedn., 2011).
Great Peace Shipping Ltd. v. Tsavliris Salvage (International) Ltd., [2002] EWCA Civ
1407; [2002] 3 W.L.R. 1617. [Hereinafter, "The Great Peace"]
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existence of a state of affairs; (ii) there must be no warranty by either
party that that state of affairs exists; (iii) the non-existence of the state
of affairs must not be attributable to the fault of either party; (iv) the
non-existence of the state of affairs must render performance of the
contract impossible; (v) the state of affairs may be the existence, or a
vital attribute, of the consideration to be provided or circumstances
which must subsist if performance of the contractual adventure is to
be possible. " 8
These requirements must be read consistently with Bell, which is the higher
authority. The requirement of "impossibility" might not be interpreted too literally;1 9
the thrust of the reasoning is that the mistake must be fundamental. In addition,
this passage emphasises that a party who is at fault in making a mistake will not
be aided by the courts. This is particularly important: why should the court assist
someone who was at fault in making a mistakeW
The other major effect of The Great Peace is to rid the law of the doctrine of
"mistake in equity". The origins of that doctrine are commonly thought to be found
in the judgment of Lord Denning MR in Solle v. Butcher.2 ' Lord Denning essentially
recognised that some mistakes were sufficiently fundamental to render a contract
voidable in equity. This was thought to supplement the common law doctrine
of mistake emanating from Bell." In effect, it was possible to rationalise the law

18
19
20

21
22

The Great Peace, 1693.
Brennan v. Bolt Burden,[2004J EWCA Civ 1017; [2005] QB 303, [Hereinafter, "Brennan"]
And in seeming contrast to the approach taken by the law of unjust enrichment: See,
Kelly v. Solari,(1841) 11 LJ Ex 10; 9 M&W 54, considered at text to nn97-103, below
[Hereinafter, "Kelly"]. However, the fact that one party will commonly be at fault for
not being aware of the true state of affairs perhaps enables mistake to be distinguished
from frustration. Frustration concerns a future frustrating event, whereas mistake
concerns an error regarding an existing fact or law. Whereas the future is unknowable,
an existing state of affairs is not, and often one of the concerned parties will be at
fault for making the mistake. However, in The Great Peace Lord Phillips MR discussed
mistake and frustration together, and, given that the difference between mistake and
frustration may simply be a slight difference in the timing of the conclusion of the
agreement, it might not be wise to pursue a rigid distinction between the two doctrines.
But the consequences of the two doctrines differ: mistake renders the contract void
ab initiowhereasfrustration discharges obligations which would have been due to be
performed after the frustrating event.
[1950] 1 KB 671. [Hereinafter, "Solle"] See C. MACMILLAN, MISTAKES IN CONTRACT LAW
(2010), particularly chapters 3 and 9.
See Associated Japanese Bank (International) Ltd v. Credit du Nord S.A.,[1989] 1 WLR
255.
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of mistake as consisting of two concentric circles: if the mistake was absolutely
fundamental, then it might render the contract void at common law, whereas
if the mistake was fundamental but a little less so, it might render the contract
voidable in equity. Clearly, this was a confusing doctrine: it was not clear whether
the mistake was such that the common law or equitable jurisdiction should be
invoked. Moreover, no allusion to this equitable jurisdiction was made in Bell,when
surely it would have been relevant to the decision in that case. As a result of such
problems, it was always difficult to square Solle with Bell, and in The Great Peace
Lord Phillips MR stated that, "we can see no way that Solle v. Butcher can stand with
2
Bell v. Lever Brothers". 3
Rejecting Sollefurther limits the scope of common mistake in English law.
This increases commercial certainty. More contracts will be upheld. But it very
much restricts the remedies available to a court. For example, under the doctrine
of Solle, Lord Denning MR found that it was possible for the court to rescind the
contract on terms. 4 Such remedial flexibility was favoured by many, and provides
one reason why Solle has been maintained and The GreatPeace not followed in other
jurisdictions. 5 Indeed, Lord Phillips MR suggested that legislative reform for the
consequences of mistake might be desirable. 26 However, given the very limited
scope of relief for mistake, it seems unlikely that legislative time will be devoted
to this topic. Parties realise that entering into a contract allocates risk between
them. Mistakes will inevitably be made, and their consequences need to be borne.
This is part of the risk assumed by entering into an agreement. Only fundamental
error should allow a party to escape the consequences of a mistake. Such a mistake
should concern an essential or basic element of the transaction, so that the contract
cannot sensibly be performed. This is a tremendously high threshold to satisfy; in
the vast majority of cases, the contract can still be carried out. Nevertheless, the
fact that a contract is rendered void, and there is no scope for holding a contract
to be voidable, may have deleterious effects upon third parties. This is, perhaps,
particularly noticeable in the context of unilateral mistake, and will be further
explained in the next section.

23
24
25

26

The Great Peace, 1777.
Solle, 695.
Miller Paving Ltd v. B. Gottardo Construction Ltd., (2007) 86 O.R. (3d) 161 at [26]
[(Ontario Court of Appeal)]: "The loss of the flexibility needed to correct unjust results
in widely diverse circumstances that would come from eliminating the equitable
doctrine of common mistake would, I think, be a step backward". See Phang (2009)
LS 534, 542-546.
The GreatPeace, 1778.
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B. Unilateral Mistake
It may be that only one party is labouring under a mistake, but that mistake is
not shared by the other side. In general, this will be the fault of the mistaken party,
and as a result the court will not award relief on the basis of mistake? But the courts
have sometimes granted relief on the basis of a unilateral mistake, finding that it
renders the contract void. Again, it is clear that the mistake must be fundamental.

Non Est Factum
A party may be able to escape a contract on the basis of non estfactum.This
enables a party to claim that his signing the contract was "not his act". The scope of
this doctrine is very limited; it is a narrow exception to the commercially important
principle that a party is bound by what he signs.8 For a plea of non estfactum to
succeed, the person must have been labouring under a "disability" or impairment,
not at fault, and fundamentally mistaken.The leading decision is Saundersv. Anglia
Building Society,2" in which Lord Wilberforce stated:
"...
a document should be held to be void (as opposed to voidable)
only when the element of consent to it is totally lacking, i.e. more
concretely, when the transaction which the document purports
to effect is essentially different in substance or in kind from the
transaction intended. Many other expressions, or adjectives [sic],
could be used - 'basically' or 'radically' or 'fundamentally"'. 3 0
This strengthens the stability of concluded contracts by restricting the types
of mistake which may render a contract void. In Saunders,an elderly woman signed
a deed which she thought assigned the lease of her house to her nephew, when
in fact the deed assigned the lease to her nephew's business associate. Even this
mistake was insufficiently fundamental: the essence of the deed was to assign the
lease of the house, and there was no mistake about this. In so defining the essential,
or basic, substance of the transaction, the identity of the assignee was excluded. It
is entirely appropriate that the scope of non estfactum be so restricted. For example,
if the claimant had succeeded in Saunders, this would have prejudiced the building
society which had innocently relied upon the existence of the contract by advancing
a mortgage in the expectation that the contract was valid. If the contract had been
27

That is not to say that other grounds of relief are not available; for example, if the
mistake has been induced by another party, then an action in misrepresentation may
lie.

28
29

LEstrange v. Graucob Ltd., [1934] 2 KB 394.
Saunders v. Anglia Building Society, [1971] AC 1004. [Hereinafter, "Saunders"]

30

Saundrs,1026.
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void ab initio,thebuilding society would have had no protection at all. Rendering
a contract void can have a profound and negative impact upon third parties to
the transaction.
Mistaken Identity
Generally, a mistake as to the identity of the other contracting party should
not provide a reason for the mistaken party to escape the transaction. For example,
if I contract to sell my book to a person, the crucial question for me is whether that
party can pay, rather than who in fact that person is. The risk of the other side not
being able to pay - regardless of his identity - is a normal incident of contractual
relationships.
In some situations, though, it would seem that the identity of the other party
is crucial. For example, the other party may have a right to set-off vis-a-vis the
claimant, and therefore the claimant may only wish to contract with him. If the
offer is expressed to be to X, who enjoys the set-off, but D purports to accept the
offer, there will be no contract. There is no correspondence of offer and acceptance.
This analysis is supported by the decision in Boulton v. Jones.31 But in Boulton it was
crucial that a reasonable person in D's position would have realised that the offer
was intended to be made to X. If D reasonably believed that he was the recipient
of the offer, and then accepted the offer, a binding contract would be concluded.3
The law in this area is complicated and has drawn a number of fine
distinctions. Cundy v, Lindsa? remains a leading decision regarding written
contracts. A defendant called Blenkarn ordered handkerchiefs from the claimants.
Blenkarn signed his name such that it looked like Blenkiron & Co., a respectable
firm known to the claimants. The claimants therefore entered into the contract and
sent the handkerchiefs to Blenkarn's address, which was different from the address
of Blenkiron. The House of Lords held that the contract was void for mistake.
Crucial to the decision was the fact that the claimants were aware of Blenkiron,
and intended to deal with Blenkiron only. Cundy can be contrasted with King's
Norton Metal Co. Ltd v. Edridge, Merrett& Co. Ltd." The claimants sent goods on
credit to Hallam & Co, which purported to be a reputable firm but was in fad a
31
32
33
34

Boulton v.Jones, (1857)2 H &N 564 [Hereinafter, "Boulton"], supported by the House
of Lords in Shogun Finance Ltd. v. Hudson,[2003] UKHL 62. See SMITH, 400.
Cf Upton-on-Severn RDC v. Powell 1942] 1 All ER 220.
Cundy v. Lindsay, (1878) 3 App. Car. 459. IHereinafter, "Cundy"]
King's Norton Metal Co. Ltd v. Edridge, Merrett & Co. Ltd, (1897) 14 TLR 98.
[Hereinafter, "King's Norton"]
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fraudster named Wallis. When Wallis failed to pay for the goods, the claimants
sought to escape the contract on the ground of mistake. The claim failed. Unlike
Cundy,the claimants did not know of Hallam & Co, and simply intended to deal
with the person who had written to them. Thus the claimants were mistaken as
to the attributes of the other party - his creditworthiness - rather than making
the more fundamental mistake of identity which was essential to the transaction.
Such a distinction is just about possible. However, drawing a distinction
between identity and attributes is fraught with difficulty. 5 As Lord Denning MR
pointed out in Lewis v. Averay:
"'Again it has been suggested that a mistake as to the identity of a
person is one thing: and a mistake as to his attributes is another. A
mistake as to identity, it is said, avoids a contract: whereas a mistake as
to attributes does not. But this is a distinction without a difference. A
man's very name is one of his attributes. It is also a key to his identity.
If then, he gives a false name, is it a mistake as to his identity? Or a
mistake as to his attributes? These fine distinctions do no good to
the law".36
Moreover, the distinction between Cundy and King's Norton is flimsy. Both
situations concerned a claimant disappointed not to receive the money promised
under a contract. The crucial mistake related to the other contracting party's ability
to pay.
Finding a contract to be void for mistake can have seriously harmful effects
upon third parties. A good illustration of this can be found more recently in Shogun
FinanceLtd v. HudsonY The claimant finance company entered into a contract to
give a car on hire-purchase terms to a fraudster who said that he was Mr Durlabh
Patel. The claimant and the fraudster never met; the transaction was carried out
through a car dealer who forwarded the information to the finance company, who
ran a credit check against Mr Patel from a distance. On the basis that Mr Patel was
creditworthy, the finance company agreed to enter into the contract. Inevitably,
the fraudster defaulted on the payments, but not before he had sold the car to the
defendant, who had purchased the car for value and in good faith.
Whether or not the claimants could succeed in establishing a mistake had a
35

And it might be noted that it has seemingly been rejected in the context of non est

factum.
36 Lewis v. Averay, [1972] 1 QB 198, 206.
37 Shogun Finance Ltd v. Hudson, [2003] UKHL 62. [Hereinafter, "Shogun"]
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significant impact upon the result of the case. If a mistake could be established,
then the contract would be void ab initio, and therefore the fraudster would never
have obtained title to the car in the first place. Under the principle of nemodatquod
non habet- a person cannot pass on a better title than that which he himself had the fraudster would not have been able to give the defendant good title to the car.
Thus, despite acting innocently and providing value when purchasing the car,
the defendant would have to give up the car to the claimant: the claimant would
still have good title to the car, and would therefore be able to sue the defendant in
conversion, a tort of strict liability.
By contrast, if the claimant failed to establish a mistake, then the claimant
would have to rely upon the rogue's fraudulent misrepresentation rather than
mistake. But the effect of misrepresentation is to render a contract voidable, not
void. Title to the car could pass to the rogue under a voidable contract, and the
claimant would have to rescind the contract in order to regain title to the car.
However, if a third party innocently acquires rights for value in the subject-matter
of the voidable contract, rescission is barred. The fact that the defendant was a bona
fide purchaser for value without notice would mean that it would be inequitable
to allow the claimant to rescind the contract once the rogue had sold the car to the
defendant. In such a scenario, the defendant does gain title to the car, and would
be able to keep the property.
Set out in this way, it may seem odd that the claimant is better protected if
he relies on his own mistake, rather than another person's fraud. As Lord Milled
observed in Shogun:
"It seems anomalous that a mistakewhich is induced by fraud should
have a less vitiating effect than one which is not; and it is difficult to
see why a mistake induced by fraud should make a contract altogether
void if it is a mistake as to the offeror's identity (whatever that may
mean) and not if it is a mistake as to some other attribute of his such
as his creditworthiness which may be equally or more material."38
Lord Millett concluded that there was no mistake in Shogun, and that the
finance company should have to rely upon the fraud instead. Lord Nicholls took
a similar view. Both judges would have overruled Candy. Lord Millett insisted that
the reasoning in Cundy was "unsound"' and that it "stands in the way of a coherent

38

Shogun, 59.

39

Shogun, 108.
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development of this branch of the law"' 4 Such an approach would have left very
little room indeed for mistake to operate. This may well be desirable; after all, the
claimant - in Shogun, the finance company - could invariably carry out further
checks in order to ensure that no mistake was made.4' More importantly, the effect
of a mistake is to render the contract void, and the deleterious effect this has upon
innocent third parties makes this an unattractive option. 42
However, Lord Millett and Lord Nicholls were in the minority in Shogun.
The majority held that the decision in Cundy was still good law: a mistake as to
identity had been made and the contract was void. Surprisingly, perhaps, Lord
Hobhouse held that the principles in this area of law were "clearand sound and need
no revision" .4Whilst it may be that the consequence of the majority decision is to
make it clear that Cundy still applies where a contract is concluded in writing and
at a distance, in part because there is still some life in the parol evidence rule,"
it is much less obvious that the principles of law in this area are sound and need
no revision. On the facts of Shogun, it might be thought that the finance company
should be insured and better able to bear the risks of fraud than the innocent
defendant who had bought the car and should not be left short-changed (of course,
the fraudster in these cases has inevitably disappeared or is not worth suing). The
harsh effect of relief for mistake should make the courts very reticent about finding
that a fundamental mistake has been made. .
Indeed, where contracts are concluded face-to-face, rather than in writing and
at a distance, there is a strong presumption that the person intends to deal with
whoever is opposite him, thus leaving very little scope for argument regarding
mistake of identity. This is sensible: the contract is properly concluded between
the parties present, and both parties should have to bear the ordinary risks about
each other's ability to fulfil the contract. However, the presumption that parties

40
41

42
43

Shogun, 83.
C. Macmillan, Mistake as to Identitiy Clarified,120 LAW QUARTERLY Ravi w 369,373 (2004);
C. Hare, Identity Mistakes: A Missed Opportunity?, 67 MODERN LAw RaviEw 993, 1003

(2004). Admittedly, it might be argued that this may be a somewhat uncommercial
approach and slow down the pace of transactions. See N. ANDREWS, CoNTRACT LAW
298-300 (2011).
CfLaw Reform Committee, Twelfth Report: Trans.erof Title to Chattels (Cmnd. 2958,1966).
Shogun, 55. Compare Sedley LJ in the Court of Appeal: "it may be remarkable that the law

governing the consequences of afraud as common as this is still in doubt, but it is": 12001]
EWCA Civ 1000.

44

See Shogun, 49 (Lord Hobhouse).
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intend to deal with each other is rebuttable; 45 surprisingly, in Ingram v. Litle the
Court of Appeal held that a contract was void for mistake of identity, even when
the parties were dealing face-to-face." This seems overly generous to mistaken
claimants at the expense of innocent subsequent purchasers. Indeed, the minority in
Shogun would have overruled Ingram, and suggested that the presumption would
7
be better viewed as a rule of law.1
The more restrictive approach generally taken in face-to-face transactions
is appropriate and should be expanded to all situations. Inparticular, it should
extend to contracts made over the telephone, or by video-link, for example. 4
The fact that mistake of identity can render a contract void is a result of the old
decision of Cundy. Where there is no correspondence of offer and acceptance as a
result of a mistake, as in Boulton,for example, it is possible to say that there was no
concluded contract. But in cases such as Cundythe claimant entered into a contract
with the person writing the letter, and there is much force in the contention of the
dissenting judges in Shogun that the claimant should not be allowed to escape the
contract on the ground of mistake.

III. DEEDS
It is clear that the scope for escaping a contract on the basis of mistake is very
limited indeed. But under a contract, the promises exchanged are not gratuitous:
both parties provide consideration for their promises. This is not necessarily the
case if property is transferred under a deed. A deed might be used as a substitute
for consideration. If a party wishes to unwind the transaction and regain the
property transferred, then it is incumbent upon the party to rescind the deed. The
jurisdiction here is equitable, and the principles which apply to the rescission of
deeds also apply to the rescission of powers of appointment exercised by trustees,
for example. 49
The appropriate role for mistake in this context has been controversial. It
has been argued that a deed should be rescinded if it can be proved that "but
45
46
47
48

Ingram v.Little, [1961] 1 QB 31, 66 (Devlin Q). [Hereinafter, "Ingram"]
Ingram, although note the strong dissent from Devlin LJ.

49

For general discussion, see C. MITCHELL, P. MITCHELL AND S. WArrERSON (eds), GOFF &
JONEs: THE LAw oF UNJusT ENRICHMENT para 9-101-9112 (Shedn., 2011). [Hereinafter,

See Shogun, 71-76 (Lord Millett), 37 (Lord Nicholls).

See Shogun, 188 (Lord Walker).
"MITCHELL"]
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for" the mistake, the party would not have transferred the property under the
deed, regardless of whether or not the mistake was fundamental. This is a very
wide test of mistake, which mirrors that commonly thought to be employed in
the realm of unjust enrichment. 1 However, a higher threshold has recently been
insisted upon before unwinding a disposition for mistakeY5 It is suggested that
this is much more satisfactory; after all, regret alone should not provide a reason
for unwinding a disposition.?
The equitable jurisdiction to set aside a transaction on the ground of mistake
is of long-standing. In Ogilvie v. Littleboy, Lindley LJ stated that:
"...a donor can only obtain back property which he has given away
by showing that he was under some mistake of so serious a character
as to render it unjust on the part of the donee to retain the property
given to him."M
A more recent formulation of the test is that expressed by Millett J in Gibbon
v. Mitchell:
"... a voluntary disposition ... will be set aside

...

so long as the

mistake is as to the effect of the transaction itself and not merely as to
its consequences or the advantages to be gained by entering into it.""
These tests for mistake have often been viewed as alternatives.5 Ogilvie has
generally been thought to be more generous as it avoids any consideration of the
difference between effects and consequences. Moreover, it has been suggested
that a serious mistake is simply one that caused the trustee to act as he did. Thus

50

Clarkson v. Barclays Private Bank and Trust (Isle of Man) Ltd, [2007] WTLR 1703 at
[41] [Hereinafter, "Clarkson"]. See, Re Betsam Trust,[2009] WTLR 1489 (Isle of Man); In
re the A Trust, [20091 JLR 447 (Jersey); Re Griffiths deceased, [20081 EWHC 118 (Ch),

[20091 Ch 162.
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This will be considered in the following section.
Pitt, 19.
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See Breadner v. Granville-Grossmar, [2001] Ch 523 at [61] (Park J.).
Ogilvie v. Littleboy, (1897) 13 TLR 399; this decision was not departed from by the
House of Lords: (1899) 15 TLR 294. [Hereinafter, "Ogilvie")
Gibbon v. Mitchell, [1990] I WLR 1304, 1309. [Hereinafter, "Gibbon"]
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For example, Professor Hayton has contrasted "the generous Ogilvie approach" with
"the restrictive Gibbon approach": D. HAYTON, P.MATrHEWS AND C. MITCHELL, UNDERHILL
AND HAroN's LAW op TRUSTS AND TRUSTESS viii (18edn., 2010). See the Royal Court of
Jersey in Re Mr and Mrs P Capital Asset Protection Plan Trust,[20081 JRC 159 and In

the matter of B and C,[20091 JRC 245.

Making Mistakes
in Clarkson v. Barclays Private Bank and Trust (Isle of Man) Ltd, DeemsterKerruish
stated that:
"The best measure as to whether the mistake was so serious as to
render it unjust for the volunteer donee to retain the moneys is if the
payment would not have been made "but for" the mistake. In other
words the mistake is the cause of the payment."57
However, it is suggested that such a test is too wide.18 Not every mistake
that causes a person to part with his property is sufficiently serious to warrant
relief. The mistake may only concern ancillary or subsidiary matters. Indeed, the
approach in Clarkson appears to conflate two separate issues: i) the seriousness of
the mistake; and ii) whether the mistake caused the disposition.
9 Lloyd
The Court of Appeal has recently considered this issue in Pitt.Y
LJ
rightly rejected a "liberal" approach, such as that advocated in Clarkson, emphasising
that it would be "a great deal too relaxedfor the donor who seeks to recover his gift" .s His
Lordship went on to reconcile Ogilve and Gibbon: the mistake must be of sufficient
gravity, and also concern the legal effect of the disposition or an existing fact which
is basic to the transaction.6'

In Pitt, Mr Derek Pitt was badly injured in a road accident, and received
compensation in the form of a lump sum and monthly payments. His wife became
his receiver, and was advised to put the money into a trust. Discretionary trusts
of income and capital were created for the benefit of Mr Pitt and his family Mr
Pitt later died, and Mrs Pitt was the sole beneficiary of the estate. Prior to Mr Pitt's
death, the trustees realised that inheritance tax applied to the trust in the same
manner as any ordinary discretionary trust. It would have been "easy"6 to avoid
such onerous tax liabilities, by simply adding a provision for at least half of the
fund applied during Mr Pitt's lifetime to be used for his benefit. 63 Indeed, the actual
distribution of the fund was consistent with such a provision. But because there
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Clarkson, 41.
Compare the view of the Jersey courts: Re S Trust, [2011] JRC 117. See MITCHELL, para
9-106.
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Pitt.
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Pitt, 208.
Pitt, 210.
Lloyd Q in Pitt, 10.
Thus benefiting from § 89 of the Inheritance Tax Act 1984, which makes allowances
for some discretionary trusts for disabled persons.
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was no such clause, on Mr Pitt's death a substantial liability to pay inheritance tax
arose. Mrs Pitt sought relief, partly in reliance on a mistake." She argued that the
money would not have been advanced, nor the trust set up, in the same manner
had the mistake concerning the fiscal consequences not been made.
On these factsLloyd Q held that although the mistake regarding the fiscal
consequences of setting up the trust was sufficiently serious, it did not go to the
legal effect of the disposition, only to the consequences. The claim in mistake
therefore failed. Such a test leaves little scope for mistake: by insisting both that it
be "serious" or "basic" to the transaction, and that the mistake concern the effect
of the disposition, the Court of Appeal in Pitt was essentially limiting relief to
instances of fundamental mistake. However, drawing a distinction between effects
and consequences remains controversial.6 After all, "people tend to view the legal
effectsin terms of the consequences they produce".66 In Wolff v. Wolff, Mann J.admitted
that the distinction is "not always easy to grasp",6' and inAnker-Petersenv. Christensen,
Davis J. noted that "in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary one of the definitions of
'effect' is given as 'consequence"',6" although he did also state that "one can see what is
behind the distinction" drawn in Gibbon.6 As Lawrence Collins J observed in AMP
(UK) Ltd v. Barker:
"If anything, it is simply a formula designed to ensure that the policy
involved in equitable relief is effectuated to keep it within reasonable
bounds and to ensure that it is not used simply when parties are
mistaken about the commercial effects of their transactions or have
second thoughts about them." 10

64

Partly under the "principle in Re Hasting-Bass", which the Court of Appeal rightly
rejected. For further discussion of this aspect of the decision, see Conaglen 12011] CLJ
301, Nolan and Cloherty [2011] LQR 499.

65

Re S. Trust [2011] JRC 117. See, MITCHELL,

66

J. Hilliard, Gibbon v Mitchell Reconsidered: Mistakes as to Effects and Mistakes as to
Consequences: Part 1,PCB 357, 365 (2004). See J.Hilliard, Limiting Re Hasting-Bass?,THE

1

9-106.

208,216-219 (2004); Langlois and Cloherty, Playing the 'Get Out of Jail Free'
Card:Mistake in the Law of Trusts,JERSE &GUERNSEY LAW REVIEW 10 (2010). [Hereinafter,
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Wolff v. Wolff, [2004] EWHC 2110 (Ch). The same comment was made by Lewison J

in Re Griffiths [2008] EWHC 118 (Ch).
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Anker-Peterson v.Christensen, [2001] EWUC B3 (Ch). [Hereinafter, "Anker-Peterson]
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See Anker-Peterson.
cited in Pitt [193].
AMP (UK) Ltd v. Barker, [2000] EWHC 42 (Ch) (Lawrence Collins J),

Making Mistakes
This seems eminently sensible. It is important that dispositions made are
not readily set aside, and that a high threshold be set before equity will disturb
what are primafacie valid dispositions. If the effect of the disposition is to benefit
a beneficiary and this is achieved, the disposition should not be set aside simply
because of a mistake regarding ancillary matters, such as tax consequences.
It must be emphasised that regret is no reason to unwind a transaction. The
important principle of security of receipt should be taken seriously. Parties should
be encouraged to take responsibility for their actions. The scope of the law's
intervening on the basis of a party's mistake should be restricted. Although Millett
J's choice of language regarding "effects" and "consequences" may be unfortunate,
given the similarity of meaning of those terms, the intended distinction is tolerably
clear: the mistake should relate to the "primary" legal effect sought, rather than
"secondary" matters which flow from that act. This goes some way to ensuring that
relief is only granted if the mistake is "fundamental".
The test used in Pitt is more restrictive than a simple "causative" test, under
which the claimant in Pitt may have succeeded. The Supreme Court has granted
permission to appeal the decision of the Court of Appeal in Pitt,but it is to be hoped
that the restrictive approach to mistake is maintained. Finality of transactions

is an important principle which should be protected.7 Litigation should not be
encouraged. The person who has made the mistake should have to live with the
consequences of the mistake. This may seem harsh, particularly in the context of
a case such as Pittsince the regime of taxation is very complicated and mistakes
are not difficult to make. 2 However, it should be remembered that often the party
actually making a mistake is a professional adviser acting for the party transferring
the property. In such circumstances, the appropriate course of action is to sue the
adviser,71 rather than try to undo the transaction, which may prejudice innocent
third parties. For example, if the claimant in Pitt had succeeded, then the Revenue
would have had to give back the tax it had legitimately collected. Since the Revenue
does not give value for the tax received, it cannot be considered to be "Equity's
Darling" such that rescission is barred." But given that the Revenue has received
money entirely innocently, properly and in its usual course of business, whereas
the claimant parted with property having made a (non-fundamental) mistake, it

71

See N. ANDREWS, MISTAKEN
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J. Howard, Hastings-Bass- OceansApart?, PCB 23, 29 (2011).
This was clearly the view of Lloyd Q4 in Pitt: see eg. [2011] EWCA Civ 197; (2011] 3
WLR 19, 142, 162, 220.
Re Slocock [197911 All ER 358. Cf the discussion of Shogun: text to nn.37-48, above.
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may well be thought that the merits lie with the Revenue. It is appropriate and
consistent to restrict the types of mistake which might ground recovery.

IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The claimant might transfer property to the defendant despite there being
nothing comparable to a contract or a deed. For such a claimant to obtain relief,
he will likely have to bring a claim in unjust enrichment, relying upon mistake as
the unjust factor. The law of unjust enrichment seems to have become increasingly
generous in its approach to mistaken claimants. Unlike the areas of law considered
above, relief does not appear to be limited to the types of mistake which might be
described as "fundamental". This is not clearly desirable.
Initially, a restrictive approach to mistake was adopted. In Aiken v. Short,
Bramwell B insisted that a "liability mistake" needed to be established:
"[The] mistake must be as to a fact which, if true, would make the
person paying liable to pay the money... [there is to be no restitution
regarding a mistake as to a] fact which would merely have made it
desirable for the person paying it to pay the money."75
Subsequently, relief on the basis of mistake was extended beyond "liability
mistakes" to gifts and instances of future liability. A test of "fundamentalmistake"
developed. For example, in Norwich Union v. Price, Lord Wright said that it was
"essential that the mistake relied on should be of such a nature that
it can be properly described as a mistake in respect of the underlying
assumption of the contract or transaction or as being fundamental
or basic."'76
This theme was pursued in Morgan v. Ashcroftj in which the Court of Appeal
identified two types of fundamental mistake: first, a mistake regarding the nature
of the transfer (such as where the claimant mistakenly believed he was under an
obligation to pay the defendant); secondly, where the claimant pays money to the
defendant, mistakenly thinking that he is paying the money to somebody else.
Such mistakes are fundamental: if I give money to a person, it is basic to that gift
that I give the correct amount to the correct person.

75
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Aiken v. Short, (1856) 1 H&N 210; 156 ER 1180.

Norwich Union v. Price, [19341 AC 455 (PC), p 463.
Morgan v. Ashcroft, 1935] 1 KB 49.

Making Mistakes
Using a test of fundamental mistake in the context of unjust enrichment has
been criticised. 8 The view has often been expressed that gifts should be easier to
unwind than contracts. 9 But why such a different approach should be taken is
not entirely clear. It may even be argued that the claimant is in fact less deserving
of protection in the gratuitous, rather than the contractual context. At least in the
contractual context, the claimant should receive something from the defendant,
and there is therefore a readily understandable reason for making the payment. 80
But where the claimant has paid money without a contract being in place, and the
claimant therefore has no right to expect something in return, it might be presumed
that the claimant must be aware of his actions, and must be confident that he is
doing the right thing in parting with his money for nothing in return. Moreover,
recipients of gifts should be entitled to assume that they are able to keep those gifts,
and allowing claims for mistake disturbs the finality of completed transactions.
There needs to be a strong reason for interference. A restrictive approach to
mistake would send a message to gift-givers that they should ensure that they are
satisfied with the consequences of their actions; if a given factor is of particular
importance, that factor should be made known to the recipient: this would allow
a claim in unjust enrichment to be grounded on failure of consideration rather
than mistake. 81 Otherwise, the claimant may, objectively, be taken to run the risk
of making a mistake.
Of course, not all cases where unjust enrichment on the ground of mistake
is pleaded will involve a gift. Sometimes a payment is made by mistake, although
the payer did not intend a gift to the recipient. But even in such circumstances, it
might be best to maintain that the payer cannot recover the payment unless he was
mistaken regarding a fundamental matter, in particular the amount transferred
or the identity of the recipient. Such a test would correspond with well-known
examples of when restitution on the ground of mistake should be available,
highlighted by Robert Goff J. in Barclays Bank Ltd v. W1 Simms & Cooke:
"(1) A man, forgetting that he has already paid his subscription to
the National Trust, pays it a second time. (2) A substantial charity
uses a computer for the purpose of distributing small benefactions.
78
79
80
81

See BURROWS, THE LAw OPREsTITUTIoN 218-219 (3edn.,2010) [Hereinafter, "BURROWS"];
VIRGO, 151-154.
BIRKSUNJUST ENRICHMENT 149 (2"dedn., 2005). [Hereinafter, "BIRKS 1"}
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Thomas,(1842) 2 QB 851.
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The computer runs mad, and pays one beneficiary the same gift one
hundred times over. (3) A shipowner and a charterer enter into a
sterling charterparty for a period of years. Sterling depreciates against
other currencies; and the charterer decides, to maintain the goodwill
of the shipowner but without obligation, to increase the monthly
hire payments. Owing to a mistake in his office, the increase in one
monthly hire payment is paid twice over. (4) A Lloyd's syndicate gets
into financial difficulties. To maintain the reputation of Lloyd's, other
underwriting syndicates decide to make gifts of money to assist the
syndicate in difficulties. Due to a mistake, one syndicate makes its
gift twice over."82
In all these examples, the relevant mistake might be said to be fundamental.
However, the judgment in Simms is generally taken as authority for the proposition
that English law adopts a "causative" approach to mistake.Y Thus as long as the
claimant can show that he would not have paid the money "but for" the mistake,
then restitution will be awardedt 4 regardless of the type of mistake. But although
the "causative mistake" test appears to have been largely accepted,"5 some doubts
have been raised, particularly in the context of gifts.86 Moreover, it might even be
suggested that, in the context of gifts, the "causative mistake" test is perhaps not
as solidly grounded in authority as may often be thought; for example, Ogilvie is
often cited in support of a causative approach, but this appears to be unconvincing
for the reasons given above.6l The causative approach appears to be based on the
premise that if the donor has made a disposition under a causative mistake, then
his donative intention is vitiated, and therefore the recipient's enrichment is unjust.
But this is unduly claimant-friendly: it is not clear that any causative mistake really
leads to a vitiation of intention,'s nor that it is unjust for the recipient to retain the
Barclays Bank Ltd v. WJ Simms &Cooke, [1980] QB 677, 697. [Hereinafter, "Simms"]
See Dextra Bank &Trust Co Ltd v.Bank of Jamaica, [2002] 1 All ER (Comm) 193 at [28];
Deutsche Morgan Grenfell v. Inland Revenue, [2006] UKHL 49 [Hereinafter, "Deutsche
Morgan Grenfell"J.
84 Subject to defences, notably that of change of position.
85 At least in so far as how the test has been articulated; none of the major cases have had
to deal with anything other than a serious mistake.
86 See Lord Scott in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, [87], cited in Pitt, [200]; Tang Hang Wu,
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Restitution for Mistaken Gifts, 20 JOURNAL OF CONTRACT LAW 1 (2004) [Hereinafter,
"W "]; A. TETTENBORN, THE LAW OF RESTITUTION IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, ch 3 (2002);
S. HEDLEY, A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION TO RESTITUTION 111 (2001): "In the absence of any
misrepresentation,it is not obvious that any remedy is desirable".
See text to note 54, above.
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Wu points out that donors give away property for a variety of reasons.

Making Mistakes
gift when that recipient was unaware of any "vitiation";the law should strive to
uphold completed transactions."
Indeed, in the context of gifts, doubts about whether or not a purely "causative"
approach is desirable have been voiced at the highest level. For example, Lord
Scott in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell has remarked:
"There are, I think, some problems about voluntary payments made
as gifts but that would not have been made but for some causative
mistake, whether of fact or law, e.g. a gift of £1,000 by A to B where B
is believed byAto be impecunious but is in fact a person of substantial
wealth and where A would not have made the gift if he had known
that to be so. My present opinion is that unless there were some other
reason, such as a misrepresentation by B, to enable the gift to be set
aside, the mistake made by A would not suffice, notwithstanding
that the payment had not been made pursuant to any legal obligation
and that but for the mistake it would not have been made. But the
availability of a restitutionary remedy to recover gifts which would
not have been made but for some mistake of fact or of law does not
need to be pursued on this appeal and can be left for another day."10
Although criticised by some, 91 it is suggested that Lord Scott is right to be
reluctant to unwind gifts for mistake. This might be explained on the basis of risk.
If the claimant gave money as a gift to the defendant, intended that the money go to
the defendant, and the correct sum was transferred, then the gift has taken effect as
intended and should not be unwound. So, for example, if a claimant intentionally
gives £100 to a charity, but later discovers, to his horror, that the charity spends
20% of its income on administration, then no claim in unjust enrichment founded
upon mistake should lie. Although the claimant may be able to show that he was
mistaken about how much of his money would be spent on administration, he
should be taken to run a risk concerning such non-fundamental matters.

89

LANGLOIS suggest that "if
the donor can show that, but for the mistake he would not have
entered into the disposition in question, it isdifficult to see on what basis his mistake could ever
reasonably be regarded as insufficiently "serious" to justify an orderfor rescission". But some
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It is suggested that the doubts raised by Lord Scott fit well with the decision
of Pitt. In Pitt, Lloyd L. explicitly recognised that "there is scope for an interesting
discussion as to whether the principles relevant at common law and in equity are, or
ought to be, more or less closely aligned",but did not wish to "add to an alreadylengthy
judgment by entering on the debate as to the correct principles at common law and the
comparison between the two bases of claim".9 However, his Lordship did go on to
consider common law cases in his discussion," and it is difficult to explain why a
gift should be protected differently at law and in equity.
It is therefore suggested that the law of unjust enrichment might be well
served by adopting the more stringent test of mistake outlined in the equitable
context in Pitt. In Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, Lord Hoff mann made it clear that risk
is to be assessed objectively,' and it seems reasonable to refuse relief where the
claimant has made a mistake regarding a non-fundamental matter: the claimant
runs the risk of making such a mistake when transferring the property, and should
bear the consequences of that mistake. Other areas of the law require a "serious",
"fundamental" or "basic" mistake to be made, and it is unsatisfactory that unjust
enrichment does not clearly operate within similar confines.
Another difference with relief in other areas of the law is that the law of
unjust enrichment appears to allow a mistaken claimant to obtain restitution, even
when the mistake made was the claimant's own fault.5 For example, in Kelly,9 the
claimant insurance company paid money to the executrix of the assured because
it believed that was required under a life insurance policy. This was a mistake: the
policy had lapsed since the assured did not pay the premiums on the policy. Even
though the claimant could have discovered that the policy had lapsed, and might
be considered to be careless not to have done so, the court held that restitution
grounded upon the mistake would be awarded. This seems very generous to the
claimant. It may be that the decision should be departed from and the payer be
said, objectively, to be a risk-taker. ' Of course, one of the best ways of trumping
92
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the risk argument in this context is by making it clear to the defendant that the
intention to benefit the defendant is conditional upon something, and making sure
the defendant realises this. But then the more appropriate unjust factor may well
not be mistake but rather failure of consideration. It is important to note that just
because a claim based upon mistake might fail, that does not preclude a claim in
unjust enrichment based upon a different unjust factor.9
Moreover, it might be argued that departing from Kelly would be consistent
with the approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in Brennan v. Bolt Burden." In
the latter case, it was held that if a party ought to have known that an issue was
about to be reconsidered on appeal, then any mistaken belief about the law on
that point would be insufficient for restitution to be awarded. Virgo has noted that
"this comes very close to saying that negligence on the part of the claimant will prevent
reliance on the mistake".' This may well be desirable: why should claimants not
simply accept the consequences of their own carelessness? There is some merit in
the law's adopting a hard stance in order to make it clear that individuals should
bear responsibility for their own errors.
To any extent that Kelly and Brennan are inconsistent, it is suggested that the
latter decision is to be preferred.101 It should also be noted that in Kelly a "liability
mistake" was at issue. In such instances it is clear that the claimant expects some
sort of quid pro quo in return for the payment. When that quid pro quo is absent, it is
easier to understand why restitution is grantedYE02 But this harks back to the idea
that the mistake must be fundamental. This is the crucial issue, which the law of
unjust enrichment might do well to bring back to the fore.
98
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See similarly Lord Brown in Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, 175.
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The two cases concerned very different facts. Indeed, a reconciliation might be
attempted (albeit at a stretch) through appreciating that the nature of risk is flexible and
responds to the particular circumstances in question. In Brennanitwas not reasonable
to proceed despite it being known that a reconsideration of the law was pending, so
the claimant was, objectively, a risk-taker. By contrast, in Kelly, it is,perhaps, arguable
that it is reasonable for insurers to pay out promptly, since the law might not want to
encourage insurers to delay pay-outs for a long period of time in order to verify whether
payment is indeed due. Prompt and early payment might be sought in return for the
ability to recover in unjust enrichment - either for mistake or failure of consideration
- if it later transpires that the payment was not in fact due (subject, of course, to the
defence of change of position). Thus, objectively, it might be arguable that the insurer
in Kelly was not taking a risk. Risk is context-specific.
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V. PROPRIETARY RESTITUTION
A claimant who transfers property to the defendant by mistake may desire
a proprietary remedy, rather than merely the personal remedy commonly
3
available in unjust enrichment. It has been argued, most notably by ChambersIO
0 4
and Birks,' that restitution may best be effected by imposing a resulting trust
upon the defendant. Such a proprietary remedy allows the claimant to enjoy an
equitable property right, which might be desirable for many reasons. For example,
a proprietary remedy would afford the claimant protection in the event of the
defendant's insolvency, and would allow the claimant to trace in Equity into any
eventual proceeds realised as a result of the property. However, English law has
not accepted that a resulting trust responds to an absence of intention to benefit
the recipient, which may arise due to the claimant's intention being vitiated by
mistake.I" Instead, only personal remedies lie as a result of the claimant's mistake.
This is satisfactory: providing proprietary protection would be unduly generous
to a party who made a mistake. For instance, if a claimant mistakenly transferred
property to a defendant who later became insolvent, it seems inappropriate for the
claimant to be protected in full due to his enjoying a property right, whereas other
innocent creditors, who provided value for their rights but obtained no proprietary
protection, would correspondingly lose out. In this area, too, awarding relief on the
basis of a mistake will impact upon other third parties. Relief for mistake should
be limited; proprietary relief would be going too far.
In some circumstances, however, the claimant may be mistaken such that title
never passes to the defendant but remains with the claimant.' 06 But such mistakes
must be fundamental. For title to personal property to pass, an intention to transfer
the property is crucial. So if the transferor is mistaken regarding the identity of the
recipient) 07 or the identity of the property,"' that might be sufficiently fundamental
for title not to pass. Such circumstances are very rare, but mean that the defendant
does not get title to the property.

103 See R. CHMBERS,RESULTING TRUsTS (1997).
104 P.Bnucs, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW oF RRSTITUTON 60-377-379(1989) [Hereinafter,
BIRs 2"1; BnRs 1, 304-307.
105 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington LBC, [1996] AC 669. [Hereinafter,
"Westdeutsche Lndesbank Girozentrale"]
106 See VIco, 586-588.
107 Middleton, (1873) LR 2 CCR 38.
108 Ashwel, (1885) 16 QBD 190.
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Whether a mistake as to the quantity of the property being transferred should
also be considered to be fundamental is more controversial. Contrary views have
been expressed in the English courts. 1 9 In Australia, the mere fad of overpayment
has been held to be a fundamental mistake such that title may not pass. 1 0 But this
is not clearly desirable. When paying the money, the claimant intends that money
should pass to the defendant. On that basis, it seems artificial to find that title to
the money does not pass at all.' If a claimant has overpaid, he should be able to
recover in unjust enrichment.
The difficult case of Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel-British Bank (London)
Ltd"12 is instructive. The claimant bank mistakenly paid $2million to the defendant
bank, believing that it was liable to make the payment, but forgetting that it had
already discharged the liability to pay. In effect, the claimant bank paid twice.
Clearly, a claim in unjust enrichment on the ground of a fundamental, liability
mistake should succeed. But the defendant bank had entered into liquidation, so
the claimant bank sought to rely upon a proprietary interest in order to achieve
priority over general creditors. The court proceeded on the basis that title to
the money had passed to the defendant bank. But this point was not explicitly
addressed; it appears arguable that there was a fundamental mistake, such that
title to the money did not pass. However, because the defendant had mixed the
claimant's money with his own, and legal title cannot survive in a mixture, the
defendant necessarily obtained legal title to the money. 3
In Chase Manhattan, Goulding J.said that
"a person who pays money to another under a factual mistake retains
an equitable property in it and the conscience of that other is subjected
to a fiduciary duty to respect his proprietary right."'
This is very broadly stated and may be liable to mislead. It has been suggested
that Goulding J.envisaged a situation in which the defendant held the property on
109 For example, compare Eldan Services Ltd v.Chandag Motors Ltd, [1990] 4 All ER 459
with Moynes v. Cooper, [1956] 1 QB 439.
110 Ilich, (1987) 69 ALR 231.
111 See Lord Millett, Restitution and Constructive Trusts, 114 LAw QUARTERLY REviEw 399,
412-413 (1998).
112 Chase Manhattan Bank NA v. Israel-British Bank (London) Ltd, [1981] Ch 105.
[Hereinafter, "Chase Manhattan"]
113 ViRco, 587-588.

114 Chase Manhattan,119.
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a resulting trust for the claimant. This is supported by the notion that a resulting
trust arises in response to an absence of intent to benefit the recipient of the property
in question. 115 This analysis is consistent with a number of cases,116 but does not
represent English law. In Wesdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v. Islington London
Borough Council," ' Lord Browne-Wilkinson insisted that a resulting trust would
give claimants excessive proprietary protection:
"Those concerned with developing the law of restitution are anxious
to ensure that, in certain circumstances, the plaintiff should have the
right to recover property which he has unjustly lost. For that purpose
they have sought to develop the law of resulting trusts so as to give
the plaintiff a proprietary interest....jI]n my view such development
is not based on sound principle and in the name of unjust enrichment
is capable of producing most unjust results. The law of resulting
trusts would confer on the plaintiff a right to recover property from,
or at the expense of, those who have not been unjustly enriched at
his expense at all, e.g. the lender whose debt is secured by a floating
charge and all other third parties who have purchased an equitable
interest only, albeit in all innocence and for value."' 18
Moreover, his Lordship held that ChaseManhattan did not concern a resulting
trust at all, but rather a constructive trust." 9 As Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained,
"athough the mere receipt of the moneys, in ignorance of the mistake, gives rise to
no trust, the retention of the moneys after the recipient bank learned of the mistake may
well have given rise to a constructive trust".
This is entirely orthodox. Once the defendant bank knew of the claimant's
mistake, it would be unconscionable for the defendant to deny that the claimant
should have the money transferred. Constructive trusts respond to unconscionable
conduct, and as such a constructive trust can legitimately be imposed. But it is
important to appreciate that this trust does not respond to the claimant's mistake,
but rather the defendant's knowledge of the mistake and the effect this has upon
his conscience.
115 See R. CHAMBERS, Rrsur nc TRUSTS 125-132(1997).
116 Notably Vandervell v. IRC, [1967] 2AC 291. See, Air Jamaica v. Charlton, 1199911 WLR
1399.
117 See Wesdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale.

118 Wesdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 716. See W. Swadling, A New Role for Resulting

Trusts?, 16 LEGAL STUDIES 110 (1996).
119 Wesdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, 714-715.

Making Mistakes
The law therefore seems to deny proprietary relief under a resulting trust for
a claimant who transfers title to the defendant on the ground of mistake. This is
satisfactory. But even if the law does develop such that a resulting trust is recognised
to respond to an absence of intention, then this does not necessarily mean that
all mistakes should give rise to a resulting trust. Otherwise commercial certainty
would be undermined, particularly because the only person aware of the mistake
may be the claimant himself. It would be imperative to circumscribe what sort of
mistakes would vitiate the claimant's intention such that a resulting trust would
be appropriate. Again, one returns to the conclusion that a fundamental mistake
should be required.
Vi. CONCLUSION
Mistakes are sure to continue to trouble the courts. This article has been
able to provide only an outline of some of the myriad of ways mistake might be
invoked by a claimant in an attempt to escape an arrangement between individuals.
But there is a common theme: mistake should be the basis of relief only in very
rare circumstances. The responsibility for not making mistakes should be placed
squarely on the shoulders of the parties themselves. When mistakes are made, it
is generally better for the consequences to lie where they fall, rather than seek to
award a remedy which may well unfairly prejudice innocent third parties. Thus
only certain types of mistake should influence the court. In essence, the mistake
must be fundamental, or basic to the transaction or gift. This is not easy to define,
but seems to include instances where the claimant mistakenly transfers property
to the wrong recipient, or transfers the wrong property.
English law has restricted the availability of relief for mistake in contract
(The Great Peace) and in Equity (Pitt), as well as dismissing the possibility of
proprietary relief under a resulting trust (Wesdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale).
The area of law which differs is that of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment has
burgeoned in recent times, but there is a danger of it expanding too far and unduly
interfering with key principles such as that of security of receipt. ' N It is suggested
that it should not be the case that any causative mistake should ground a claim in
unjust enrichment. For example, if an uncle gives a gift to his nephew, but later
realises his nephew is homosexual, it seems inappropriate for the uncle to be able
to obtain restitution on the basis that he would not have given the gift had he not
120

For example, Birks wrote, prior to Simms, "the insistenceonffundamentality, as a quality
additionalto causality, is a measure against "floodgates of litigation" and consequent insecurity
of receipts." See Bzns 2,159.
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been mistaken about his nephew's sexuality. It is not obvious that such mistakes
truly vitiate the giver's intention, and even less clear that that should lead to the
conclusion that the defendant's enrichment is unjust. Why should the defendant
not be able to rely upon the apparent validity of such a gift? The situation might be
different when the mistake in question was fundamental; in such circumstances,
the defendant's retention of the benefit may well be said to be unjust. Otherwise,
the claimant should bear the risk of his giving away the property by mistake.
This article has only been able to deal with mistake relatively briefly. In not
developing the rationales of each area to the full, there is the risk that some might
think mistakes have been made. But an overview of this area places the law of unjust
enrichment in stark contrast to the other areas which have been examined. The
intuition of Lord Scott in Deutsche Morgan Crenfell is correct and it should not be
the case that any causative mistake should lead to restitution for unjust enrichment.
In this area, as with all others, a fundamental mistake should be required.

